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1 Introduction
The host country effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) constitute a traditional concern in inter-
national and development economics. One of the consequences of the impressive surge in FDI flows
in recent decades has been to bring this debate back to the fore. The current view of the impact of
multinationals is optimistic, and the general feeling is that, in many circumstances, their arrival can
significantly contribute to the development of destination economies.1
Among the potential channels through which FDI is thought to enhance the development of host
economies, spillovers to domestic firms is often cited as a salient one. Nevertheless, we have a far
from full understanding of the different channels through which these externalities might operate.
Two main possibilities have been put forward in the literature. The first is that the introduction of
foreign technologies in host countries through multinational production can provide technology adoption
opportunities for local firms by such means as demonstration effects (Burstein and Monge-Naranjo,
2009) and labor turnover (Markusen and Ethier, 1996).2 The second possibility is that the presence
of multinational firms increases the demand for intermediate goods and creates backward linkages
to local suppliers. The strengthening of the supply chain could then result in forward linkages to
local downstream producers in the form of lower input prices (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen and
Venables, 1999).
Our contribution focuses on the second of these channels. Previous studies generally overlook the
possibility that technologies used by multinational firms require different intermediate goods to those
used by domestic firms. In this paper, we show that accounting for such differences significantly alters
the effect of inward FDI on domestic firms and welfare in the host economy. Entry by foreign firms
induces changes in the supply chain to obtain inputs compatible with the foreign technology. These
changes can have adverse effects on firms using inputs compatible with the domestic technology. The
reconfiguration of the supply chain benefits foreign firms and can also trigger technology adoption by
domestic firms. When technology adoption is costly, the effects of foreign entry on domestic firms are
not uniform. In this case, foreign entry benefits the best firms and is detrimental to the low-productivity
firms. Technological incompatibilities can thus generate complex interactions between vertical linkages
and technology adoption decisions, with important implications for the effects of openness to FDI in
terms of technology adoption, firm selection, output reallocation and welfare.
Empirical evidence finds that foreign firms tend to operate more advanced technologies that require
specialized inputs.3 For example, in Slovakia, Volkswagen requires that all suppliers obtain VDA quality
certificates,4 in accordance with the requirements of the German automotive industry (UNCTAD, 2001
1UNCTAD (2008) tracks the yearly number of changes in national regulations conducive to foreign investment. It
reports an increase in the number of these changes from 77 in 1992 to 177 in 2006 with a peak of 270 in 2004.
2The predominant role of multinational firms in knowledge creation is visible in aggregate statistics. Keller (2009) refers
to data from the National Science Foundation showing that 83% of all manufacturing R&D in the US was conducted by
parents of US multinationals in 1999.
3In addition, econometric evidence shows that multinationals use more advanced technologies than domestic firms, for
both developed and developing economies. See the surveys in Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) and Barba-Navaretti
and Venables (2004).
4Verband der Automobilindustrie.
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p. 157). Standards are also an important requisite for entry into the global supply chains in the food
industry. UNCTAD (2007 p. 18) reports on the case of the European supermarket industry, where
supermarkets require that suppliers, irrespective of country of origin, comply with private protocols on
food safety standards, logistical requirements, and process documentation.
A compelling example that highlights the incompatibilities central to our analysis is provided by a
recent case study by Javorcik et al. (2006) on the Mexican soaps, detergents and surfactants industry.
When Mexico opened its borders to foreign investors, incoming US multinationals brought with them
technologies and product formats that were previously unavailable locally (e.g. “compact formulas”).
The report documents how suppliers catering for multinationals (some foreign-owned themselves) had
to reformulate their inputs by substituting foreign standard ingredients with cheaper ingredients when
catering for domestic producers. Moreover, Mexican detergent producers incurred substantial costs
reformatting their products to introduce the foreign technology.
We model interactions between firms in two vertically related industries. Foreign firms enter the
downstream industry and compete with domestic firms for local consumers. In the baseline model,
all downstream producers – domestic and foreign – are assumed to source intermediate inputs locally.
Given technological incompatibilities, suppliers make decisions about which type of intermediate inputs
they will produce. Under the assumption that efficiency increases with the range of available interme-
diate varieties (Ethier, 1982), suppliers’ production choices affect the relative efficiency (and relative
costs) of the two technologies. The impact of these choices on downstream firms differs depending on
which technology they use and can consequently affect their decision to adopt a technology. Conversely,
foreign entry and technology adoption in the downstream industry affect the demand for inputs and
the suppliers’ technology choices. We look at firms with heterogeneous productivity to study the role of
firms’ capacities in technology adoption and spillovers. We embed the industry model into an occupa-
tional choice model – in the spirit of Lucas (1978) – where individuals have heterogeneous managerial
abilities and choose whether to run firms or work as production workers.5
We study equilibria with free entry for all three types of firms – foreign, domestic suppliers and do-
mestic downstream producers – and free technology choice for domestic firms in both industries. There
are three different types of equilibria, depending on the extent of technology adoption by downstream
entrepreneurs. In two opposite extremes, none or all of the domestic firms adopt the foreign technology.
In intermediate equilibria, only the best entrepreneurs self-select into adopting the foreign technology.
Our results are presented in two ways. First, comparative statics show how technology adoption,
input availability and foreign entry depend on structural parameters. We find that, when foreign entry
costs are sufficiently low, equilibria necessarily involve technology adoption by domestic firms.6 In
this case, a reduction in foreign entry costs induces more foreign entry and also a larger proportion of
upgrading firms in upstream and downstream industries. Similarly, we find that a decrease in the cost
of technology adoption induces more entry by foreign firms and fosters technology adoption in both
5Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) also use this formulation in contexts related to ours.
6In our model, a decrease in foreign firms’ entry costs has the same effects as an increase in the relative productivity
of foreign firms or an increase in the total mass of potential foreign entrants.
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upstream and downstream industries. This creates strong complementarities between foreign firms and
the most productive domestic firms.
A second way to present our results is to investigate the relationship between the extent of foreign
presence in the economy and the performance of domestic firms. Foreign presence can be observed by
econometricians, but entry decisions by multinational firms are endogenous and depend upon profit
opportunities. We study how changes in structural parameters, mainly the fixed entry cost for multina-
tionals, simultaneously affect foreign presence and domestic firm variables. We construct two measures
of foreign presence similar to those used by empirical studies: the relative number of foreign firms and
their share in total industry sales. Our model explains positive correlations between foreign presence
and the average labor productivity of suppliers, the share of domestic entrepreneurs adopting the foreign
technology, and their productivity. It also generates a negative correlation between foreign presence
and domestic firm survival.
This issue is the focus of an extensive empirical literature.7 We believe that our theory offers a
plausible explanation for the mechanisms driving the reduced-form empirical studies. The literature
delivers the following key messages. First, there is robust evidence of positive vertical spillovers: the
presence of multinational firms tends to be associated with improvements in the productivity of local
suppliers. Second, there is evidence of negative horizontal spillovers in the case of developing countries,
and weak evidence of neutral or positive horizontal spillovers in the case of developed economies.
Importantly, firm heterogeneity matters: only the productivity of firms with high absorptive capacity
tends to be positively correlated with foreign presence. The correlation tends to be negative for firms
with low absorptive capacity. Lastly, there is evidence of positive externalities between multinational
firms consistent with our model.
We derive a simple measure of the gains from openness to FDI in our framework, inspired by the work
of Arkolakis et al. (2012). We use empirically relevant parameters to quantify welfare gains depending
on foreign presence, technological incompatibilities and technology adoption. Conditional on observed
foreign presence, gains from FDI are substantially lower when intermediate goods are technology-
specific and no downstream domestic firms adopt the foreign technology. Conversely, welfare gains can
be greater when a significant proportion of downstream domestic firms adopt the foreign technology.
Our paper contributes to a small, but growing body of formal literature studying backward linkages
between multinational firms and local suppliers. The pioneering study in this area is by Rodriguez-Clare
(1996), who develops a model in which multinationals source intermediate goods in a low-wage country:
if the intensity with which they source local inputs – the “linkage coefficient” – is high enough, MNEs
create higher net backward linkages that push the underdeveloped region out of the “bad” equilibrium.
Markusen and Venables (1999) develop a similar intuition in an industrial organization approach that
is closer to ours. As in the work of Rodriguez-Clare, the demand for inputs (backward linkages)
created by foreign plants causes entry upstream. This exerts downward pressure on the costs of all
downstream firms, generating a forward linkage. Domestic firms, more intensive users of local inputs,
gain relatively more. A recent paper by Alfaro et al. (2009) expands on this literature to study the
7See the surveys in Gorg and Greenaway (2004), Lipsey (2002), and Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004).
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role of financial development in linkage creation. In all three papers, however, demand for intermediate
goods from multinational firms is directed towards all local upstream firms (in addition to imports).
This assumption contradicts evidence suggesting that multinationals tend to source from a small base
of local suppliers, as presented by UNCTAD (2001) and OECD (2002) among others. By incorporating
this key feature, we improve on this early work and provide a framework better suited to explain
empirical results.
Our paper complements the work by Lin and Saggi (2007). These authors study a multinational
firm’s exclusive contracts with local suppliers in a model of a two-tier Cournot oligopoly, in which a
foreign firm transfers technology to local suppliers. Exclusive contracts restrict technology transfers
from the multinational firm to the group of exclusive suppliers, thus leaving domestic producers with
a limited number of suppliers who do not benefit from the technology transfers. The framework we
develop differs with respect to theirs. Crucial to our results, we allow for free entry and free technological
choice for all types of firms in both industries. Our paper is also the first to explicitly model the role
of firm heterogeneity. This unveils a role for different types of externalities between firms and yields
additional predictions that are in line with the empirical evidence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the models set-up while Section 3
examines the different equilibria and comparative statics. Section 4 analyzes the welfare implications.
In Section 5, we discuss a simple extension of the model allowing for trade in intermediate goods.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Set-up of the model
We now develop a model of an economy composed of two vertically related industries. In the downstream
industry, domestic and multinational firms compete to serve local consumers. In the upstream industry,
intermediate goods are assumed to be produced only by local suppliers. We assume that these two
industries face a competitive supply of labor and we normalize the wage to unity.
For the ease of reading, we henceforth denote all variables pertaining to the downstream industry
in uppercase, as opposed to lowercase for upstream industry variables.
Preferences
Consumer preferences are assumed to be represented by the following standard CES utility function:
U =
(∫ N
0
Qρi di
) 1
ρ
We denote by σ = 11−ρ the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the final
good. N refers to the measure of all available varieties produced. If E denotes total income spent in
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the economy, the demand curve for a firm producing variety i is:
Qi =
(
Pi
P
)−σ E
P
where Pi is the price of variety i and P =
(∫N
0 P
1−σ
i di
) 1
1−σ the price index of final goods.
Production and technological incompatibilities
There are two technologies for final good production, which we label the “D-technology” and the “M-
technology”. Throughout, we think of these two technologies as domestic and foreign. The total number
of varieties produced in the economy is N = ND + NM where the subscripts indicate the technology
used to produce the varieties.
A central assumption is that intermediate goods are technology-specific. We call D-type inputs
those required to produce using the D-technology and M-type inputs those produced for use with the
M-technology. In both technologies, intermediate varieties are assumed to be horizontally differentiated
and to enter final production as a CES composite, as in Ethier (1982).
The technology-specific production function used by the typical downstream firm i is:
Qi = ΦiL
1−β
i
(∫ nT
0
q
ε−1
ε
T ij dj
) βε
ε−1
(1)
where Li is the measure of workers employed by downstream firm i, Φi is the ability of firm i, nT is the
range of input varieties specific to technology T, qT ij is the quantity of input variety j for technology
T consumed by downstream firm i, and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between input varieties.
In general, ε may differ from the elasticity of substitution between final goods σ.
Parameter β measures the importance of technology-specific inputs in production. It is a key param-
eter in our model and should be interpreted as a measure of technological incompatibilities. A natural
alternative formulation would include a third category of inputs compatible with both technologies. In
such a case, compatible inputs would play a neutral role in the model and, as in this version, all effects
found would operate through the technology-specific inputs.8
This specification of technology aims to capture the idea that the division of labor enhances pro-
duction efficiency (see Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1993). The larger the set of available intermediate
varieties for a given technology, the lower the costs associated with the use of this technology. This
property plays a key role in our analysis.
As the wage rate is set to unity, the price index for inputs for a firm producing under technology
T, which we label ΛT , is given by:
ΛT =
(∫ nT
0
p1−εjT dj
) β
1−ε
8To be more precise, with a free-entry condition in the compatible inputs industry, we would find that the mass of
suppliers producing compatible inputs is constant and does not depend on foreign entry or technology adoption by other
firms. Compatible inputs would thus play the same role as a numeraire.
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Upstream, λT represents the quantity of labor required to produce one unit of the intermediate good
with technology T ∈ {D,M}. The case in which the foreign technology is has higher labor productivity
would correspond to λM < λD. Nevertheless, we will solve the model for the general case, without
specifying a particular ranking of these parameters.
Relative variable costs associated with each of the two technologies, ΛM/ΛD, depend on the relative
availability of specialized inputs nM/nD:
ΛM
ΛD
=
(
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
nM
nD
) β
1−ε
(2)
As usual in monopolistic competition models, we assume that there is a large potential set of
varieties of both intermediate and final goods, and that each firm produces a different variety.
Managerial ability and occupational choice
The economy is populated by a mass L of individuals. As in Lucas (1978), individuals are heterogeneous
in their managerial abilities and can become entrepreneurs in either industry or instead choose to work
for other firms (in the upstream or downstream industries).9 A key difference between these occupations
is that returns to managerial activities are given by firms’ profits whereas wages are the same for all
workers and determined in the labor market. More able individuals find becoming entrepreneurs more
attractive. For simplicity, we consider that upstream firms are homogeneous and that ability matters
only for managers of downstream firms.10
Managerial ability Φ is a continuous random variable drawn from a cumulative distribution G(Φ)
with support [1,∞). We assume G(Φ) has the form of a Pareto distribution:
G(Φ) = 1− Φ−k
where the shape parameter k is assumed to satisfy k > σ−1. This assumption yields tractable solutions
while fitting the observed distributions of firm size well (see Axtell, 2001, and Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple, 2004). It has been used extensively in recent theoretical contributions (see the survey in
Redding, 2011), hence allowing for a comparison of our results with the current literature.
We assume that downstream domestic managers can operate the domestic technology at no extra
cost. However, they can produce with the M-technology upon payment of an additional fixed cost FM
in terms of labor. This fixed cost does not depend on foreign presence.11
There is a mass L∗ of foreign entrepreneurs with the same ability distribution as the domestic
entrepreneurs, G(Φ). Given its functional form, rescaling L∗ is equivalent to shifting the distribution
9Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) also use this formulation in contexts related to ours.
10This assumption avoids any complicated sorting of managers across industries. Heterogeneous suppliers are considered
in previous versions of this paper and yield similar results (see Carluccio and Fally, 2008).
11Alternatively, we could assume that the presence of multinational firms affects the capacity to adopt foreign technolo-
gies through imitation or pure technology transfers. Here, we abstract from this direct effect and focus on how pecuniary
externalities (competition and availability of inputs) affect the adoption of the foreign technology by domestic firms.
7
(reflecting a different distribution of abilities for foreign entrepreneurs and domestic entrepreneurs).
3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the model is defined by the following system of equations:
piM = 1 (3)
piD = 1 (4)
ΠD(ΦD) = 1 (5)
ΠM (ΦM ) = ΠD(ΦM ) + FM (6)
ΠM (ΦMNE) = FMNE (7)
The first two equations are equilibrium conditions for the upstream industry. piT refers to upstream
suppliers’ profits using technology T ∈ {D,M}. At equilibrium with free entry, free occupational and
free technology choice, profits associated with producing each type of input are equal to the opportunity
cost w = 1 of working as an employee. For each technology T ∈ {D,M}, profits in the upstream
industry decrease with the number of suppliers nT .
The last three equations are equilibrium conditions for the downstream industry. ΠT (Φ) refers
to the profits made by downstream firms with ability Φ using technology T ∈ {D,M}. Downstream
profits are monotonically increasing in managerial ability Φ (as we show in Section 3.2), whereas the
returns to labor and to upstream managers are independent of managerial ability. Hence, the share of
individuals becoming entrepreneurs, the share of entrepreneurs adopting the foreign technology and the
share of foreign entrepreneurs entering the country are pinned down by the minimum value of ability
that generates profits equal to the value of the relevant alternative. These are given by ΦD, ΦM and
ΦMNE respectively and are implicitly defined by equations (5), (6) and (7).
An equilibrium is defined as a 5-tuple (nD, nM ,ΦD,ΦM ,ΦMNE) satisfying equations (3) to (7).
It is useful to construct an index N˜T representing the mass of firms using each technology T ∈
{D,M} weighted by their ability Φ. The masses of firms depend on firm entry and technology adoption
decisions as reflected by the thresholds:
N˜M (ΦM ,ΦMNE) = L
∫∞
ΦM
Φσ−1dG(Φ) + L∗
∫∞
ΦMNE
Φσ−1dG(Φ)
N˜D(ΦD,ΦM ) = L
∫ ΦM
ΦD
Φσ−1dG(Φ)
The intuition of the model is best developed in three steps. We first analyze the upstream industry,
taking entry in the downstream industry as given. We then study the downstream industry, taking
the upstream configuration (input prices) as given. In Section 3.3, we examine joint equilibria for both
industries. Through to Section 3.4, we study equilibria holding expenditure E fixed. In Section 3.4, we
study the general equilibrium by considering a labor market clearing condition and solving for E.12
12As we discuss in section 3.4, E proves to be independent of foreign entry and technology adoption.
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3.1 Equilibrium in the upstream industry
Using the functional forms for demand and technology, we obtain the following expressions for equa-
tions (3) and (4):
piM =
βρ
ε
E
nM
N˜MΛ
1−σ
M
N˜DΛ
1−σ
D +N˜MΛ
1−σ
M
piD =
βρ
ε
E
nD
N˜DΛ
1−σ
D
N˜DΛ
1−σ
D +N˜MΛ
1−σ
M
The measure of suppliers self-selecting into each technology depends positively on the demand for
each type of input (itself determined by final good demand). Combining the two equations, we find
that the relative measure of suppliers equals the relative share of technologically differentiated varieties
in consumption: nMnD =
N˜MΛ
1−σ
M
N˜DΛ
1−σ
D
. The right-hand side of this equation is, however, itself endogenous
to the relative number of suppliers. As described in equation (2), the price index of inputs ΛT for
each technology directly depends on the number of suppliers. Incorporating (2), we find the following
solution for the total and relative number of suppliers:
nM + nD =
βρE
ε
(8)
nM
nD
=
(
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
) β˜
1−β˜
(
N˜M
N˜D
) 1
1−β˜
(9)
with: β˜ = β . σ−1
ε−1
It is then easy to recover the solution for nD and nM : given the relative mass of downstream plants,
there is a unique equilibrium in the upstream industry. The coexistence of different technologies in
the upstream industry requires the elasticity of substitution between inputs to be sufficiently large:
ε − 1 > β(σ − 1). This condition is assumed throughout and satisfied when ε and σ are similar.
Equilibrium in the upstream industry is then uniquely determined by the relative mass of downstream
firms N˜M
N˜D
using each technology.13
We can then derive a relationship between the relative cost of inputs and the relative masses of
firms producing final goods using each technology:
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
=
(
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
N˜M
N˜D
) β˜
1−β˜
(10)
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
> 1 means the M-technology is more advantageous.14 In equilibrium, the relative cost advan-
tage of the M-technology depends positively on its relative productivity
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
: the more efficient the
13In an extreme case where the mass of downstream firms N˜T is zero for a particular technology T , no supplier adopts
this technology. The mass of suppliers for the alternative technology is βρE
ε
.
14Throughout the rest of the paper we refer to
Λ1−σ
M
Λ1−σ
D
> 1 as the relative cost advantage of the M-technology. Strictly
speaking, this ratio refers only to variable costs. We omit the word variable for simplicity.
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technology M is, the larger the proportion of suppliers choosing to produce with it. Most importantly,
this equilibrium relationship also shows that the higher the relative mass of firms using technology M,
the lower the relative costs of M-type inputs. Higher demand for M-type inputs (backward linkages)
prompts suppliers to produce varieties of the M-type. Through backward linkages, downstream indus-
trial structure determines the upstream industry configuration. Because of the love for variety in inputs,
this in turn favors the cost advantage of the M-technology, generating a forward linkage. Because of
the incompatibility of both technologies, these pecuniary externalities are positive among firms using
the foreign technology and negative towards firms using the domestic one. The exponent β˜
1−β˜ plays an
important role as the elasticity determining the strength of these forces. It depends positively on β:
the larger share of technology-specific inputs in final good production the stronger the reaction of the
upstream industry to changes in the downstream industry. It also depends negatively on ε (which is
inversely related to love for variety in inputs) and positively on σ (which is inversely related to love for
variety in final goods).
3.2 Equilibrium in the downstream industry
In this subsection, we treat the number of suppliers (and thus the input price index) in each technology
as given and characterize the equilibrium in the downstream industry. Profits generated by the typical
downstream plant using technology T with an ability draw Φi can be expressed as:
ΠT (Φi) =
Eρσ−1
σ
Φσ−1i Λ
1−σ
T
P 1−σ
(11)
From equation (11), it is apparent that profits are monotonically increasing in ability Φi. Since the
earnings of suppliers and workers are independent of managerial ability, there is an ability cutoff ΦD such
that individuals with parameter Φi > ΦD choose to run downstream firms (equation 5). Entrepreneurs
decide to take on the foreign technology provided that profits made with the M-technology ΠM (Φ)
exceed profits earned with the D-technology ΠD(Φ), plus the fixed costs of technology adoption FM .
There exists a second cutoff ΦM such that the domestic entrepreneur with ability ΦM is indifferent
between both technologies (equation 6).
Multinationals only operate the M-technology. They enter the host country to serve the local market
as long as expected profits are positive (equation 7). Foreign entry is costly: it requires a fixed cost
of FMNE units of (local) labor. It is straightforward to show that there is a strictly positive mass of
foreign firms entering the domestic market for any finite value of FMNE (FMNE = ∞ corresponds to a
situation with no foreign firms, which we refer to as “autarky” in Section 4).
The relative cost advantage of operating the M-technology plays a key role in determining entry
and technology adoption decisions. When
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1, the M-technology is relatively more expensive to
use, and all domestic entrepreneurs choose to use the D-technology. When, however, the advantage
of operating the M-technology is large enough, all entrepreneurs abandon the domestic technology.
Formally, this requires the cost advantage to be large enough with respect to the fixed costs of technology
adoption,
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
> (1 +FM ). For values of
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
in between these two extreme values, there exist mixed
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equilibria with positive shares of domestic entrepreneurs operating each technology.
We present here the expressions for the more general latter case, and we relegate the other two to
the appendix. When 1 <
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< (1 +FM ), solving from the equilibrium conditions yields the following
expressions for the thresholds:
ΦD =
(
kσ
k− (σ−1)
L
E
) 1
k
1 + F 1− kσ−1M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1
+
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1

1
k
(12)
Φσ−1M =
Λ1−σD
Λ1−σM − Λ1−σD
. FM Φ
σ−1
D (13)
Φσ−1MNE =
Λ1−σD
Λ1−σM
. FMNE Φ
σ−1
D (14)
The survival threshold in equation (12) decreases with the fixed cost of technology adoption, the
fixed cost of foreign entry, and the cost advantage of the M-technology. The probability that an
entrant survives (Φ−kD ) is proportional to the share of consumption for the goods produced using the
D-technology, given by the inverse of the term in brackets. As shown in equations (13) and (14), the
relative thresholds of technology adoption and foreign entry are simple functions of the relative cost
of inputs and the fixed costs. Higher technology adoption costs imply a greater minimum ability for
technology adoption to be profitable. Similarly, higher fixed costs of foreign entry induce a higher ability
threshold for foreign entrepreneurs to break even. Lastly, both thresholds are decreasing functions of
the cost advantage of the M-technology. These results hold for both the ratio of each of the thresholds
to ΦD and for their absolute values.
The three thresholds completely characterize the mass of downstream firms (N˜D, N˜M ) as a function
of input costs (ΛD,ΛM ). Using the Pareto distribution properties and the expressions derived above,
we obtain the relative masses of firms N˜M
N˜D
as a function of the relative cost of intermediates ΛMΛD :
N˜M
N˜D
=
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1−1
F
1− k
σ−1
M +
L∗
L
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1−1
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
1 −
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1−1
F
1− k
σ−1
M
(15)
The numerator reflects the weighted mass of firms operating the M-technology: domestic firms upgrad-
ing technology and foreign firms. The denominator is the fraction of domestic firms using the domestic
technology.
3.3 Joint equilibrium in upstream and downstream industries
As described in Section 3.1, an equilibrium in the upstream industry is characterized by a duplet of
supplier masses n = (nD, nM ) satisfying the supplier free entry conditions (3) and (4). Equations (9)
and (8) describe how to uniquely solve for n as a function of the relative mass of downstream firms,
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and it would be straightforward to rewrite it as a function of a triplet of productivity thresholds
Φ = (ΦD,ΦM ,ΦMNE). Hence, equilibrium in the upstream industry can be described as a function
n = nup(Φ).
In turn, as described in Section 3.2, an equilibrium in the downstream industry is characterized by
Φ = (ΦD,ΦM ,ΦMNE) satisfying the free entry conditions in the downstream industry (5), (6) and (7).
Equations (12), (13) and (14) uniquely solve for Φ as a function of the relative input price index and,
given the definition of the input price index, it is straightforward to rewrite it as a function of the mass
of suppliers n. Hence, equilibrium in the downstream industry can be described as a function
Φ = Φdown(n).
We define a joint equilibrium as a vector (n,Φ) = (nD, nM ,ΦD,ΦM ,ΦMNE) that satisfies all free-
entry conditions (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7). Equivalently, a joint equilibrium is characterized by (n,Φ)
such that Φ = Φdown(n) and n = nup(Φ) are simultaneously satisfied.
In general, there is no unique joint equilibrium. While equilibrium in one industry is unique for any
given configuration of the other industry, there is more than one solution satisfying both equations at the
same time. This feature is common to many models of vertical linkages with increasing returns to scale,
including Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Markusen and Venables (1999), and Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996).
As in some of these studies, we find that some of these equilibria are unstable as defined in the following:
Definition A stable equilibrium is defined as a vector (n,Φ)=(nD,nM ,ΦD,ΦM ,ΦMNE) such that:
i) Φ = Φdown(n) and n = nup(Φ), i.e. all free-entry conditions are satisfied.
ii) For any vector n′ in a neighborhood of n, limt→∞(nup ◦Φdown)t(n′) = n.
iii) For any vector Φ′ in a neighborhood of Φ, limt→∞(Φdown ◦ nup)t(Φ′) = Φ.
A joint equilibrium that is not “stable” is defined as “unstable”. A small deviation from an unstable
equilibrium can drive the economy away from the initial equilibrium due to successive adjustments in
the downstream and upstream industries. Conversely, “stable” equilibria have the property whereby
firms’ decisions following a small deviation take the economy back to the original equilibrium. In line
with previous work (e.g. Markusen and Venables, 1999), we focus our analysis on stable equilibria.15
If condition i) is satisfied, then conditions ii) and iii) are formally equivalent given that both functions
Φdown(.) and nup(.) are continuous. In other words, we could define stability depending on the effect
of deviations in either the downstream or upstream industries: both definitions would be equivalent in
our framework.
15A rigorous treatment of stability would call for a dynamic setting describing the evolution of firm entry and techno-
logical choice depending on present and future profits. Such a treatment is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our
simple definition of “stability” is sufficient to rule out equilibria where comparative statics would be counter-intuitive and
to focus on a class of equilibria where comparative statistics are fairly homogeneous.
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There are three types of equilibria depending on the extent of technology adoption in the downstream
industry. A first type of equilibria (type 1) is characterized by no technology adoption by downstream
domestic firms. This occurs when
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1, even if there is entry by foreign firms in the downstream
market. A second type of equilibria (type 2) is characterized by a positive fraction of downstream
domestic firms adopting the foreign technology. This occurs when there is a cost advantage
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
> 1 of
using M-type inputs. A third type of equilibria (type 3) is characterized by all firms using the foreign
technology. The following proposition summarizes how parameter values affect the existence of each
type of equilibria:
Proposition 1 Assuming βkε−1 < 1, the following statements hold:
i) There can be at most one stable equilibrium with no technology adoption (type 1). A necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is: F
k
σ−1−1
MNE >
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L .
ii) There can be at most one stable equilibrium with a subset of domestic firms adopting the for-
eign technology (type 2). A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the existence of such an
equilibrium is: F
k
σ−1−1
MNE >
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L (1 + FM )
− (ε−1)−βk
β(σ−1) .
iii) For any parameter values there exists a unique stable equilibrium with all domestic firms adopting
the foreign technology (type 3).
There is no stable equilibrium with the two technologies coexisting (types 1 and 2) if βkε−1 > 1 (see
appendix). Hence, throughout we focus on the case where βkε−1 < 1.
16
Proposition 1 shows that multiplicity arises in general, except when the fixed cost of foreign entry is
sufficiently low.17 As described in point i), large values of the fixed cost of foreign entry induce entry of
a mass of foreign firms that is insufficient to trigger foreign technology adoption (type-1 equilibrium).
This case is fully tractable (expressions in appendix), and both
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
and N˜M
N˜D
are decreasing in FMNE .
As described in point iii), any set of parameter values are compatible with an equilibrium featuring
full technology adoption: N˜D = nD = 0. This case is also fully tractable (expressions in appendix).
This full-technology-adoption equilibrium (type 3) is the only possible outcome for low values of the
fixed cost of foreign entry. The condition F
k
σ−1−1
MNE <
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L (1 + FM )
− (ε−1)−βk
β(σ−1) is sufficient to rule out
equilibria with less than full technology adoption. The condition is more likely to be met the lower
FM : when the cost of technology adoption is low, lower multinational entry is required to trigger full
technology adoption.
16Evidence on productivity dispersion suggests that this condition is likely to be satisfied. β reflects the share of
technology-specific inputs in production, which is likely to be less than one half, and the Pareto coefficient for the
dispersion of sales k
σ−1 is generally less than 2. Moreover, we could expect σ and ε to be relatively close.
17To be more precise, the proposition gives conditions on the fixed cost of foreign entry with respect to the technological
advantage of the M-technology and the relative measures of foreign entrepreneurs. As already stated, given the functional
form of the distribution of abilities, L
∗
L
also represents the distance between the support of foreign and local ability
distributions.
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The remainder of this section focuses on cases with intermediate values of FMNE which feature equi-
libria where domestic firms self-select into different technologies (type 2). This case is not analytically
tractable. Nevertheless, comparative statics and a detailed qualitative description of joint equilibria
are possible.
Figure 1 provides an example, with log
(
N˜M
N˜D
)
on the Y-axis and log
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
)
on the X-axis.18 The
“upstream” curve refers to equation (10) while the “downstream” curve refers to equation (15) when
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
> 1 and becomes linear when
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1. Although the two curves may intersect more than
once, their relative slopes help determine whether an equilibrium is stable or not. The slope of the
downstream curve reflects how the downstream industry (particularly the relative mass of firms using
the foreign technology on the Y-axis) reacts to changes in the relative availability of inputs (X-axis). A
steeper curve means that a deviation in the upstream equilibrium has a larger impact on the downstream
industry. Conversely, the slope of the upstream curve is inversely related to how the upstream industry
reacts to changes in the downstream industry, i.e. the strength of backward linkages.19 A flatter
upstream curve means that a deviation in the downstream equilibrium (relative mass of firms on the
Y-axis) has a larger impact on the relative mass of suppliers (on the X-axis). In line with the formal
definition, a stable equilibrium corresponds to an intersection where the upstream curve is steeper than
the downstream curve. Hence, label “E” on the graph refers to a stable equilibrium and label “U” to
an unstable equilibrium.
-
5
0
5
1 0
-1 0 1 2 3
 
Downstream (shift)
Upstream
E
U
Figure 1: Equilibrium with partial technology adoption
18The figure was constructed with the following parameter values: k
σ−1 = 1.25, β = 0.25, σ = ε = 4,
λD
λM
= 2,
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE = 0.33 and FM = 20. The dotted line (shift) has
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE = 1. Under this parameter configuration, no
type 1 equilibrium arises. The choices for k
σ−1 , β and σ are motivated by existing studies, as discussed in Section 4.
19The slope of the upstream curve is 1−β˜
β˜
. The larger the share of specific inputs in production, the flatter it is.
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Proposition 1 states that there is at most one stable equilibrium of this type. In addition, a stable
equilibrium with partial technology adoption satisfies the comparative statics given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 In a stable equilibrium with partial technology adoption (type 2), a decrease in the
foreign entry cost FMNE leads to:
i) A larger mass nM of suppliers using the foreign technology.
ii) A smaller mass nD of suppliers using the domestic technology.
iii) A higher ability threshold ΦD of domestic firms survival.
iv) A lower ability threshold ΦMNE of foreign firm entry.
v) A lower ability threshold ΦM of technology adoption.
The larger β, the stronger these effects. A decrease in the technology adoption cost FM has the same
qualitative effects as FMNE.
A lower foreign entry cost induces further adoption of the foreign technology in both the upstream
and downstream industries. Graphically, this can be illustrated by an upward shift of the downstream
curve in Figure 1 (this corresponds to equation 15 where the right-hand side is negatively related to
FMNE). In a stable equilibrium where the slope of the downstream curve is not as steep as the upstream
curve, E moves right and up, which corresponds to a higher relative availability of M-type inputs (larger
measure of suppliers of M-type inputs and smaller measure of suppliers of D-type inputs) and a larger
relative mass of downstream firms using the M-technology.
A lower cost of inputs compatible with the foreign technology induces more foreign firms to enter
(equation 14 combined with 12), and more domestic firms to adopt the foreign technology (equation 13
combined with 12). This causes fewer domestic firms to survive (equation 12). These effects add to the
direct effect of the foreign entry cost on ΦMNE and ΦD (i.e. holding the price of inputs constant).
This case is useful to study the role of technological incompatibilities in our framework. When
these are relatively small (β close to zero), the upstream curve rotates to become more vertical. A
change in the downstream curve does not affect the relative availability of inputs. The effect of the
cost of foreign entry on the proportion of domestic firms adopting the foreign technology is very small
(ΦMΦD remains constant). When β is large, a shift in the downstream curve induces larger changes in
the relative availability of inputs, thus triggering a greater change in technology adoption (graphically,
the upstream curve rotates to become more horizontal as β increases). A similar role is played by the
coefficient of the productivity distribution k: a larger value (meaning less dispersion) makes the slope of
the downstream curve steeper (equation 15): technology adoption and foreign entry are more sensitive
to input costs.
Interestingly, a decrease in the domestic technology adoption cost FM has qualitatively similar
effects. While encouraging foreign entry triggers domestic technology adoption, the converse is also true:
facilitating technology adoption induces foreign entry. The model hence highlights complementarities
between innovation and FDI policies which, to the best of our knowledge, had not been investigated
by previous studies.
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Foreign presence and domestic firms’ performance
We now use our model to study the relationship between observed foreign presence (FP) and the
performance of domestic firms. We derive two measures of foreign presence. First, we define FPN as
the ratio of the number of foreign firms to domestic firms:
FPN =
L∗Φ−kMNE
LΦ−kD
=
L∗F
− k
σ−1
MNE
L
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1
Second, we define FPS as the ratio of foreign to domestic firm sales:
FPS =
L∗FMNEΦ−kMNE
LΦ−kD + LFMΦ
−k
M
=
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1
1 + F
1− k
σ−1
M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1
The above formulae are for the case in which both technologies coexist in equilibrium (type 2 above).
When there is no technology adoption by domestic firms, we have FPS = L
∗
L F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1
. With
full technology adoption, FPN and FPS become L
∗
L
(
FMNE
1+FM
)− k
σ−1 and L
∗
L
(
FMNE
1+FM
)1− k
σ−1 respectively.
These measures are endogenous in our model. Both are decreasing in the foreign entry costs FMNE
and increasing in the relative exogenous efficiency of the foreign technology
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
, and the ratio of the
minimum ability of foreign entrepreneurs to the minimum ability of domestic entrepreneurs (as given
by L
∗
L ).
20 In equilibria with partial technology adoption, a reduction in FM unambiguously raises
unweighted foreign presence FPN. The effect of FM on FPS is ambiguous. It increases the relative
masses of firms using the foreign technology and benefits foreign firms. However, technology adoption
by domestic firms increases competition, which could reduce foreign presence weighted by sales. With
full technology adoption, only the latter effect comes into play, and reductions in FM decrease both
measures of foreign presence.
Using the results derived in the previous subsection, we can study how changes in the parameters
of the model simultaneously affect foreign presence and other variables of interest. Assuming λM < λD
we find:
Proposition 3 In equilibria with partial technology adoption, differences in foreign entry costs FMNE
across industries or time generate:
i) a positive correlation between FP and the share of suppliers adopting the foreign technology;
ii) a negative correlation between FP and the availability of D-tech inputs;
iii) a positive correlation between FP and the fraction of domestic firms adopting the M-technology;
iv) a negative correlation between FP and the mass of domestic entrepreneurs.
20These statements take into account for the effect of input availability on foreign presence. We can verify that FP
increases with
Λ1−σ
M
Λ1−σ
D
as long as the latter is less than 1 + FM , which is verified under partial technology adoption.
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The same correlations are generated by changes in the relative exogenous efficiency of the foreign
technology
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
and by changes in the relative mass of foreign entrepreneurs L
∗
L .
Points i) and ii) imply that changes in structural parameters generate a positive correlation between
foreign presence and the average labor productivity of suppliers. Points iii) and iv) show that changes
in the same structural parameters generate correlations between domestic firm survival and technology
adoption and the extent of foreign presence in the economy.21
The link between foreign presence and these key indicators of domestic industrial performance
has been the focus of an extensive literature. Empirical studies generally regress a measure of the
productivity of domestic firms on a sector-level measure of foreign presence (typically the share of
foreign firms in output) in the sector the domestic firms operate (horizontal spillovers) or in downstream
industries (vertical spillovers). Some clear patterns arise from this extensive body of work.
First, foreign presence tends to be related to improvements in the productivity of domestic firms in
upstream industries. This result has been established by Javorcik (2004) with a panel of Lithuanian
firms. She uses time-varying sector-specific measures of foreign presence in a specification where supplier
TFP is in differences (both first- and long-) to remove firm fixed effects. She finds that a one-standard-
deviation increase in foreign presence is associated with a 15% increase in supplier productivity. A
number of other works confirms this result qualitatively (e.g. see the survey in Alfaro and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2004).
Second, the evidence on horizontal spillovers is mixed.22 For developing countries, a large group
of studies has found consistently negative effects. One example is Aitken and Harrison (1999) for the
Venezuelan manufacturing industry. Using panel plant-level data in first- and long-differences, they
find that domestic firms in sectors with larger multinational presence have lower TFP than those in
sectors with less foreign presence (a 10% increase in foreign presence reduces domestic firm TFP by 2.67
percentage points). In the case of developed economies, results are often not statistically significant
(although some studies find positive and significant effects, e.g. Keller and Yeaple, 2009). There appears
to be a role for firm heterogeneity: firms with high abilities (“absorptive capacity”, following Cohen and
Levin, 1990) tend to improve their performance following multinational entry, whereas foreign presence
is detrimental to firms that lack such capacity.23 A handful of papers show that this heterogeneity
involves foreign firms. An example is Sabirianova et al. (2005) who use panel data from manufacturing
firms in the Czech Republic and Russia and find that the productivity advantage associated with being
a foreign firm increases with the share of other foreign firms in total output.24
21Starting from an equilibrium with full technology adoption, the changes in the structural parameters do not affect
input costs. In this case, a decrease in the foreign entry costs FMNE increases foreign presence and decreases ΦM , leading
to both lower technology adoption and firm survival.
22In the survey by Gorg and Greenaway (2004), 33 out of 40 papers find either negative or not statistically significant
effects.
23Gorg and Greenaway (2004) survey this aspect of empirical work.
24Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that plants with foreign equity receive positive spillovers from foreign firms. Liu
(2008) replicates these results for China.
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The bulk of the empirical literature takes a reduced-form approach which is generally not informa-
tive of the underlying mechanisms driving the results.25 We propose a theoretical mechanism through
which variables on both sides of the equation respond to changes in structural parameters that are
unobserved by econometricians. In particular, technological incompatibilities tend to naturally gen-
erate the coexistence of positive vertical spillovers and heterogeneous horizontal spillovers. They also
rationalize positive externalities among multinational firms.
To link our results with the findings in the empirical literature, we need to say a few words on
the practical aspects of productivity measurement. If physical output is not observed and firm-specific
prices are unavailable, which is generally the case, the measure of output most commonly used is sales
deflated using industry-wide price indices. It is well known that this procedure can generate biases
in the productivity estimates, especially in differentiated product industries.26 Also, in our model,
externalities among downstream firms come from changes in the availability of intermediate varieties,
affecting the input price index ΛT . They do not affect firm efficiency, which is given by the Φ’s (although
it would be straightforward to incorporate efficiency gains associated with the M-technology into the
model). Nevertheless, most available studies have information on total expenditure and use industry-
wide deflators (typically, producer price indices) to proxy for physical quantities of inputs. In this
case, changes in input prices are unlikely to be properly accounted for and are likely to show up in the
residual of the estimated production function, thus affecting measured productivity. It is then likely
that the effects that we highlight affect the empirical measures of horizontal spillovers.27
A recent paper by Kee (2011) addresses these two issues and provides a set of empirical results
closest to our theory. Her data on the Bangladeshi garment industry allow her to observe which
domestic firms share suppliers with MNEs and to construct a firm-specific measure of “sibling foreign
presence”. For each domestic firm, this measure gives the share in industry capital of all foreign firms
that source from at least one common supplier with the firm. She uses a within estimator and has
access to firm-specific prices and the number of input suppliers (both local and foreign proxied by
imports). She finds that sibling foreign presence has a significant effect on domestic firm productivity,
while the effect of industry foreign presence (traditional definition) it not significant. Consistently
with our theory, she finds that sibling FDI presence affects domestic productivity by expanding the
availability of intermediate varieties. Interestingly, in a placebo experiment were siblings are assigned
randomly, she finds no effect of sibling foreign presence. This suggests a selection mechanism, which
can be rationalized by our model.28
25An exception is Kugler (2006), who motivates his empirical analysis with a dynamic model with externalities where
capital accumulation by foreign firms increases the productivity of domestic firms. Another exceptions are Kee (2011) and
Alfaro and Chen (2012) who uses a structural approach to quantify the importance of spillover versus selection effects.
26See Katayama et al. (2009) and Melitz (2000), who show that, with product differentiation, measurement problems
might imply that measured productivity reflects markups instead of firm efficiency.
27Halpern et al. (2009) use the case of imported inputs to study how changes in input prices affect empirical TFP
measures. Katayama et al. (2009) discuss another channel and show that changes in input prices can affect markups
(through changes in marginal costs), and therefore show up as changes in measured productivity.
28Kee (2011) also takes an IV approach that uses the everything-but-arms initiative as a shock to foreign presence
(arguing that it was unexpected by the firms). The EBA initiative provides free access to the EU for products from 48
developing countries, including Bangladesh. Rules of origin apply to the tariff cuts, prompting foreign firms targeting the
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3.4 General equilibrium: income and occupational choice
The general equilibrium of the model is characterized by a system comprised of equations (3) to (7)
plus the following labor market clearing condition:
L = ρE + LΦ−kD + LFMΦ
−k
M + L
∗FMNEΦ−kMNE (16)
The first term on the right-hand side is the amount of inputs (labor and other) used in the downstream
industry. This term includes total employment in the upstream sector plus the mass of upstream
entrepreneurs (βρE), plus labor corresponding to variable labor inputs (excluding fixed costs) in the
downstream sector (1−β)ρE. The second term corresponds to the number of domestic entrepreneurs in
the downstream sector. The third and fourth terms correspond to the fixed costs incurred by upgrading
firms and multinationals.29
This equation pins down total income E. After incorporating equations for thresholds (12), (13)
and (14) into (16), we obtain that total income is proportional to labor income (which corresponds to
population L after normalizing the wage to unity):
E
L
=
k
k − ρ
In other words, foreign entry and technology adoption do not affect the share of income from en-
trepreneurship. This property is a consequence of the assumption that productivity is Pareto dis-
tributed. This would not hold in a more general case.
4 Welfare effects from openness to FDI
We now look at the welfare effects from FDI openness, comparing the equilibrium with multinationals
to that where foreign entry is prohibitively costly (FMNE = ∞), labeled “autarky” for simplicity. We
compare the real wage 1P in both situations (the nominal wage is normalized to one). Our measure of
welfare is PPA : the ratio of the price index in the open economy to the one under autarky. As discussed
above, the same measure applies to changes in real income per capita ELP .
We consider three cases: no technological incompatibilities,30 technological incompatibilities with
no technology adoption (type 1) and technological incompatibilities and technology adoption (type 2).
In the first case, in which inputs are not specific to a particular technology, welfare gains are a
EU to increase their level of local sourcing. Kee argues that the EBA has not directly affected domestic firm productivity,
thereby providing an exclusion restriction.
29By Walras law, this implies a balance of payments equilibrium. It can be achieved if we assume that profits generated
by foreign firms stay in the country. An alternative assumption would be that local entrepreneurs engage in FDI abroad
(with their intermediate goods to produce abroad being procured there). At a symmetric equilibrium, their profits would
equal those made by foreigners in the home country.
30When inputs are not specific to a particular technology, the mass of suppliers is constant and does not depend on
foreign entry. This case is therefore equivalent to setting β = 0, i.e. assuming that labor is the only input.
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simple function of foreign presence (FPS) and the Pareto coefficient of the ability distribution:
P
PA
=
(
1 + FPS
)− 1
k (17)
(proof in the appendix). In a recent article, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) show that
welfare gains from trade can be reduced to a simple function of the share of consumption of domestic
goods for a broad class of models. This expression is similar to the one in their heterogeneous firms
specification, with output-weighted foreign presence instead of the ratio of imports to the consumption
of domestic goods. This formula also resembles the one in Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), who
extend the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to include multinational production.
When inputs are specific to each technology and when no domestic firm adopts the foreign technology
(type 1), the formula becomes:
P
PA
=
(
1 + FPS
)− 1
k
+ β
ε−1 (18)
Conditional on foreign presence, the decrease in the final good price index is lower than in the first
case. The larger the share of technology-specific inputs in downstream production β, the smaller the
welfare gains ceteris paribus. Assuming that kβε−1 < 1 (Proposition 1), welfare gains from foreign entry
are positive despite technological incompatibilities.
In the general case with technological incompatibilities and technology adoption in both industries
(type 2), welfare gains depend not only on foreign presence but also on the share of domestic firms
adopting the M-technology:
P
PA
=
(
1 + FPS
)− 1
k
+ β
ε−1
[
1 + (Λ− 1)SM
]− 1
k
+ β
ε−1
[
1− SM
]− β
ε−1 (19)
where Λ ≡ Λ
1−σ
M
Λ1−σD
is the cost advantage of the M-technology and SM =
(
ΦM
ΦD
)−k
refers to the fraction of
domestic firms adopting the foreign technology. Foreign presence and the share of consumption in D-
technology goods are no longer a sufficient statistic for welfare gains: technology adoption by domestic
firms may alter these gains.31 In a stable equilibrium, we can show that the lower the foreign entry and
technology adoption costs, the higher the welfare (see appendix). However, other things being equal, a
larger share of technology-specific inputs in production lowers the welfare gains from foreign entry and
technology adoption.
Under the assumption that the foreign technology is “superior”, we can also make a comparison
with equilibria with full technology adoption (type 3). More precisely, we assume that, with an equal
number of suppliers for each technology, profits are larger using the foreign technology. Equivalently,
the gain in variable costs in the upstream industry are assumed to be larger than the extra fixed costs
31The comparison depends on the extent and the gains from technology adoption. There are cases where welfare gains
are smaller than (1 + FPS)−
1
k
+
β
ε−1 and cases where gains are larger. Gains are larger only when Λ is sufficiently large.
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in the downstream industry:32
M  D ⇐⇒
(
λ1−σM
λ1−σD
)β
> 1 + FM (20)
In this case (see appendix), welfare gains are always larger in an equilibrium with full technology adop-
tion (type 3) compared to no or partial technology adoption (type 1 and 2) when there is multiplicity
in equilibria. The above assumption does not preclude the existence of such Pareto-inferior equilibria
as shown in Proposition 1 (since it does not impose any restriction on FMNE). Switching from one equi-
librium to another requires the coordination of plants in both industries. In that sense, technological
incompatibilities act as a barrier to technology adoption.
A simple quantitative illustration
Although our model is highly stylized, we can use empirically relevant parameters to provide a simple
quantitative illustration of the welfare effects of FDI with technological incompatibilities.
The simplicity of the welfare formulae implies that we only need values for a small set of parameters.
These are: the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of abilities k, the elasticities of substitution
σ and ε and the share of technology-specific inputs in downstream production β. For all cases, we also
need figures for the share of output produced by foreign firms (which determines FPS).
Although it is difficult to estimate the shape of productivity distributions, it is relatively straight-
forward to estimate the shape of firm-size distributions. In the model, sales are proportional to Φσ−1,
which implies that firm size follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter kσ−1 . Existing estimates
of this coefficient generally lie between 1 and 1.5 (see Axtell, 2001; Helpman et al., 2004). We choose
k
σ−1 = 1.25, as in Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009). Estimates of elasticities of substitution vary
substantially across industries (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). To take a stand, we use σ = ε = 4, which
is close to the median estimate by Broda and Weinstein (2006) and the main estimate by Bernard et
al. (2003). We stress that the conclusions derived here are not sensitive to this choice. Concerning
β, US input-output tables (BEA) show that the total share of intermediate goods in production is
approximately one half on average (Fally, 2012). To provide an illustration, we use a benchmark value
β = 0.25 assuming that, on average, half of intermediate goods are technology specific. Foreign firm
output shares vary significantly across markets and industries. Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2010)
report that gross output value by foreign firms as a share of GDP in OECD countries varies between
6% (Japan) and 58% (Portugal). Javorcik (2004) reports FDI shares of 31.5% on average for Lithuania
(with values between 6.6% and 59.8% across manufacturing industries). Aitken and Harrison (1999)
report FDI shares of employment between 0% and 35% across industries in Venezuela. Given these
figures, we use a value of 25%.
We analyze the three above cases in the same order. In the first case with no incompatibilities,
32Profits associated with the technology T can be written: AΛ1−σT where A is an entrepreneur-specific profit shifter.
The definition of “superiority” means that for any entrepreneur: AΛ1−σD > 1 =⇒ AΛ1−σM > AΛ1−σM + FM as long as the
relative number of suppliers is the same. This condition is equivalent to condition (20) in the text.
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welfare gains are given by equation (17). 25% of output produced by foreign firms (FPS=0.33) implies
a 8.0% increase in real wages.
In the second case with technological incompatibilities (β = 0.25), but no technology adoption by
downstream domestic firms, the relevant equation is (18). With 25% of output produced by multina-
tionals, we obtain an increase in the real wage of 5.4%. The difference compared with the previous case
is large and not sensitive to the choice of the elasticity of substitution, although it crucially depends on
the difference between β and σ−1k . When the share of technology-specific intermediate goods is instead
β = 0.5, implied welfare gains are reduced to 2.9%.
The third case implies that, when foreign entry triggers technology adoption by downstream do-
mestic firms, having data on foreign presence is not sufficient to compute welfare gains. It also requires
information on technology adoption which is generally unavailable. One possibility in line with our
theory is to identify upgrading firms as those that share suppliers with foreign firms. Kee (2011) finds
this proportion to be 52% for the Bangladeshi woven industry, where foreign firms are largely present,
and 15% for the non-woven sector. These figures suggest that technology upgrading may concern a
large fraction of firms. Quantitatively, welfare implications also crucially depend on the productivity
gains from the use of the foreign technology. We assume as before that 25% of output is produced by
foreign firms and that 25% of domestic firms adopt the foreign technology. If the size increase related
to the adoption of the foreign technology is less than Λ− 1 = 56%, implied welfare gains (equation 19)
are less than without technology adoption, i.e. less than 5.4%. If instead the size increase is larger than
120%, welfare gains are larger than those without technological incompatibilities (8.0%).33
5 Extension: intermediate goods trade
We now discuss how the possibility of importing intermediate goods of the M-type affects the analysis.
For simplicity we focus on a partial equilibrium set-up where wages are exogenous.34 Assume there
is an exogenous mass nF of foreign suppliers able to supply M-type inputs to downstream firms using
the M-technology, subject to an iceberg trade cost τ > 1. The price index of M-type inputs becomes:
ΛM = (nM + τ
1−εnF )
1
1−ελM (imports imply that it is bounded above: ΛM < λMτn
1
1−ε
F ).
Downstream equilibrium conditions (equations 5, 6 and 7) remain the same and, given relative
input costs, so does the solution for the downstream industry thresholds. Concerning the upstream
industry, the free-entry equations (3) and (4) must be verified as long as both types of suppliers coexist.
Equations (8) and (9) have to be verified for nM + τ
1−εnF instead of nM . However, the solution for the
relative availability of inputs are also unchanged: equation (10) is unaffected as long as the upperbound
in ΛM is not reached.
There is a difference, however, in terms of total employment in the local upstream industry. Al-
though the total measure of input varieties nD + nM + τ
1−εnF remains constant, the mass of local
33Note that the model can be calibrated to match these two examples.
34A full general equilibrium model would also require specific assumptions to retrieve the trade balance. The conclusions
obtained from such model would depend on the specific assumptions made about the type of firms that can export, which
is outside the scope of the paper.
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suppliers nD + nM is smaller than in the benchmark case and now depends on the demand for M-type
inputs, affected by trade costs τ and the availability of imported inputs nF .
Previous work has looked into how the potential of multinational firms to create linkages when trade
in inputs is allowed for. Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) empirically define the “linkage coefficient”
of MNEs as the value of inputs both domestically per unit of labor hired locally. In this simple extension
of our model, this measure is an increasing function of the ratio nM
nM+τ1−εnF
. It depends on domestic
technology adoption. When the local supplier base is mainly oriented towards the domestic technology,
an increase in foreign presence implies larger imports and smaller overall demand for the local upstream
industry. When, on the contrary, foreign entry is accompanied by widespread technology adoption
by domestic downstream and upstream firms, the share of imported inputs is low at the resulting
equilibrium. These results are not identical to, but resemblant of, those in Rodriguez-Clare (1996) that
suggest that underdeveloped regions attract multinationals with low linkage potential. A decrease in
transport costs reduces, ceteris paribus, the linkage coefficient. However, imports reduce the price index
of M-type inputs and may also trigger technology adoption by downstream domestic firms. This can
increase the demand for M-type inputs and foster technology adoption by local suppliers.
6 Concluding remarks
The effects of foreign direct investment on the development of host economies are a matter of ongoing
debate. In this paper we develop a model around the key assumption of “technological incompat-
ibilities”: as suggested by empirical evidence, foreign firms are assumed to operate more advanced
technologies which also require different types of inputs. These differences in technologies affect the
nature of backward and forward linkages between foreign firms and local suppliers. In cases where pro-
ductive efficiency is determined by the availability of intermediate inputs, supplier technology choices
determine the relative costs associated with each technology.
Our analysis delivers novel insights into the impact of foreign entry on domestic firms’ productivity,
technology adoption, survival, and welfare. Technological incompatibilities create strategic comple-
mentarities among plants using the same technology: the larger the share of plants operating a given
technology, the wider the availability of compatible intermediate inputs, reducing unit costs. Since
technology adoption is costly, firm heterogeneity plays a natural role: only the most productive firms
find it optimal to adopt the foreign technology and to benefit from the decrease in the cost of intermedi-
ate inputs. Firms that do not engage in foreign technology adoption suffer from increased competition
and from a reduction in the availability of inputs compatible with the domestic technology. The least
productive ones are forced out. We show that technological incompatibilities condition the welfare
effects of FDI.
The predictions of the model are consistent with extensive empirical evidence on FDI spillovers.
While most of available evidence is in direct and reduced-form, our theory provides a framework which
we hope could guide future empirical research.
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Appendix
Section 3: Analytical results for type-1 and type-3 equilibria
• Section 3.2. When Λ
1−σ
M
Λ1−σD
< 1, there is no technology adoption by domestic firms (ΦM =∞). In
this case: ΦD =
(
kσ
k−σ+1
L
E
) 1
k
[
1 + L
∗
L F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1
] 1
k
, the expression for ΦMNE is the same
as in the main text. The ratio of mass of firms becomes: N˜M
N˜D
= L
∗
L
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1−1
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE .
When
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
> (1+FM ), all domestic firms adopt the foreign technology (ΦM = ΦD and N˜D = 0).
In this case:
ΦM =
(
kσ
k−σ+1
L(1+FM )
E
) 1
k
[
1 + L
∗
L
(
FMNE
1+FM
)1− k
σ−1
] 1
k
Φσ−1MNE =
FMNE
1+FM
Φσ−1M
• Section 3.3. The equilibrium with no technology adoption (type 1) is characterized by:
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
=
(
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L
) β(σ−1)
ε−1−βk
< 1 and N˜M
N˜D
=
(
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L
) ε−1−β(σ−1)
ε−1−βk λ1−εD
λ1−εM
With full technology adoption (type 3 with N˜D = nD = 0), we have:
N˜M =
[
k
k−(σ−1)
(
LF
1− k
σ−1
M + L
∗F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
)(
E
σ
) k
σ−1−1
]σ−1
k
ΛM =
(
ε
ε−1λM
(
βρE
ε
) 1
1−ε
)β
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) A type-1 equilibrium is defined as an equilibrium with no technology adoption by domestic firms.
This situation can arise if and only if
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1. In this case, the downstream curve given by expres-
sion (15) simplifies:
N˜M
N˜D
=
L∗
L
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1−1
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE (21)
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Combining with equation (15) that characterizes the upstream industry, we obtain that
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1 if and
only if: F
k
σ−1−1
MNE >
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L . The slope of the upstream curve (in log), i.e. the elasticity of the relative
advantage of the foreign technology w.r.t N˜M
N˜D
is given by β˜
1−β˜ while the slope of the downstream curve
is given by the exponent of
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
in equation (21): kσ−1 − 1. Stability is ensured when the downstream
curve is flatter, which is equivalent to our assumption βkε−1 < 1. Moreover, there is a unique intersection
since both curves are log-linear in this case.
(ii) Lemma 1 below ensures that the downstream curve increases faster in the interval
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
∈ (1, 1+FM )
than in the interval (0, 1); i.e. when there is technology adoption. We can deduce that on the internal
(1, 1 + FM ) the downstream curve will be strictly above the curve given by equation (21) above. In
turn, if the upstream curve is below the curve given by equation (21), we obtain a sufficient condition
for the absence of a type-2 equilibrium. Using expression (10) for the upstream curve, this happens
when F
k
σ−1−1
MNE <
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L (1 + FM )
(ε−1)−βk
σ−1 . In the case where F
k
σ−1−1
MNE >
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
L∗
L (1 + FM )
(ε−1)−βk
σ−1 , the
uniqueness of stable type-2 equilibria derives from Lemma 1. Using Lemma 1, we know that the slope
of the downstream curve (in log) is first decreasing and then increasing (or always increasing) over
the interval
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
∈ (1, 1 + FM ). Given that the upstream curve is linear (in log), it implies that the
upstream curve cuts the downstream curve at three points at most: first from above, then from below,
and finally from above. If the upstream curve cuts the downstream curve only twice, it would be
once from below and once from above. In any case, there is at most one stable equilibrium where the
upstream curve cuts the downstream curve from below.
(iii) For any parameter values, there exists a stable equilibrium where the foreign technology is the
only one being used. Foreign firms, by assumption, do not switch to the domestic technology. Moreover,
the relative advantage of using the foreign technology would be infinite in this case:
Λ1−σD
Λ1−σM
= +∞ since
all suppliers would adopt the foreign technology and since all downstream firms would require foreign-
type inputs. A small deviation of the relative number of suppliers would not change domestic firms’
adoption: all prefer the foreign technology as long as
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σM
> 1 + FM .
As stated in the text, stability requires the downstream curve to be flatter than the upstream curve
around the equilibrium. The upstream curve (in log) has a constant slope (equation 10) with coefficient
1
β˜
− 1. We focus here on the slope of the downstream curve. First we re-write the downstream curve
as a function f(x) where x ≡ Λ
1−σ
M
Λ1−σD
. This function f(x) is defined for the interval 0 < x < 1 +FM . The
slope of the downstream curve (in log) is then given by the elasticity ∂ log f(x)∂ log x . For x < 1, this elasticity
equals kσ−1 − 1. For x > 1 (i.e. with partial technology adoption by domestic firms), we show that:
Lemma 1: For x ≡ Λ
1−σ
M
Λ1−σD
∈ (1, 1 + FM ):
(i) ∂ log f(x)∂ log x >
k
σ−1 − 1.
(ii) ∂ log f(x)∂ log x is first decreasing and then increasing in x, or always increasing.
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Point i) implies that kσ−1 −1 < 1β˜ −1 is a necessary condition for the slope of the downstream curve
to be flatter than the upstream curve, and therefore a necessary condition for the existence of stable
type-1 and type-2 equilibria. This is equivalent to the condition kβε−1 < 1 imposed in Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: In addition to x, we introduce the notations: a = kσ−1 − 1; g(x) ≡ F−aM (x− 1)a
and b ≡ L∗L F−aMNEF aM . We denote the slope of the downstream curve by ε(x) ≡ ∂ log f(x)∂ log x . The proof here
focuses on empirically-relevant cases assuming a < 1. Similar properties can be shown for a > 1.35
Point (i) can be shown by writing:
ε(x) =
ax
x− 1
1
1− g(x) −
a
x− 1
b
(
x
x−1
)a
1 + b
(
x
x−1
)a > axx− 1 − ax− 1 = a
To prove (ii) we first derive ε(x) to get: ∂ε(x)∂x =
a
(x−1)2 [h(x) +m(x)], with h(x) =
axg(x)
(1−g(x))2 − 11−g(x)
and m(x) =
(
b( xx−1)
a
1+b( xx−1)
a
)(
1 +
a
x
1+b( xx−1)
a
)
> 0. The remainder of the proof shows that h(x) +m(x) is
negative (or null) below a certain threshold in x and positive when x is above this threshold.
When x converges to 1, m(x) also converges to 1. The derivative of m(x) is:
m′(x) = −
b
(
x
x−1
)a
[
1 + b
(
x
x−1
)a]2 1x− 1 × ax
(
2− 1− a
x
)
We can see that the derivative is negative, therefore m(x) ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover m(x) is convex. To see the
convexity of m(x), we can check that the product of the first two terms decreases with x (in absolute
value), and the product of the last two terms also decreases with x. This implies that m′′(x) > 0.
In turn, we can check that h(x) satisfies:
1. h(x) < −1 if x < x1 where x1 is (uniquely) defined by ax1 + g(x1) = 1. This can be seen after
writing:
h(x) + 1 =
axg(x)
(1− g(x))2 −
1
1− g(x) + 1 =
g(x)
(1− g(x))2 [ax+ g(x)− 1]
2. h(x) > 0 if x > x2 where x2 is defined by ax2g(x2) + g(x2) = 1. This can be seen after writing:
h(x) =
axg(x) + g(x)− 1
(1− g(x))2
3. h(x) is convex for for x ∈ [x1, x2]. Taking the derivative w.r.t. x:
h′(x) =
ag(x)
(1− g(x))2
(
1 +
[
ax− 1
x− 1
]
+
[
2
x− 1
axg(x)
1− g(x)
])
Since g(x) is increasing in x, the term ag(x)
(1−g(x))2 is also increasing in x. The first term in brackets
is increasing if a < 1. In turn, the derivative of the second term in brackets is:
axg(x)
(1− g(x))2(x− 1)2
[
ax+ g(x)− 1
]
> 0 if x > x1
35If a > 1, h(x) is always larger than −1 and convex, i.e. h′′(x) ≥ 0, for all x > 1. In the case a > 1, the slope can be
always increasing instead of being first decreasing and then increasing.
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We now combine our results on m(x) and h(x). Since m(x) < 1 and h(x) < −1 for x < x1, point
1. implies that h(x) + m(x) is negative for x < x1. Point 2. implies that h(x) + m(x) is positive for
x > x2 since m(x) > 0 and h(x) > 0 for x > x2. By continuity of h(x) and m(x), the sum h(x) +m(x)
is equal to zero for at least a value of x∗ ∈ (x1, x2). Moreover, on this interval both m(x) and h(x)
are convex (point 3. above). The threshold x∗ is therefore unique (a convex function can switch sign
and become positive only once). Since the derivative ∂ε(x)∂x has the same sign as h(x) + m(x), we can
conclude that ∂ε(x)∂x is negative for 1 < x < x
∗ and positive for x > x∗.
Section 4: Expression for welfare relative to autarky
Here we present the proof for the general case (equation 19 for type-2 equilibria) but the proof is
very similar for other cases (type 1 with or without technological incompatibilities). Expressions for
welfare gains can be obtained from the free-entry condition for domestic firms. If at least some domestic
firms use the D-technology both in autarky (when FMNE = ∞) and in open economy, the free-entry
equation (5) gives:
P 1−σ
P 1−σA
=
Λ1−σD
Λ1−σA
.
Φσ−1D
Φσ−1A
where PA and ΛA correspond to the price index of final and intermediate goods in autarky, and ΦA
corresponds to the survival threshold in autarky. Using equation (12), we obtain:
ΦD
ΦA
=
1 + F 1− kσ−1M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1
+
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1

1
k
From the free-entry conditions for upstream firms (equation 3), we can show that the mass of suppliers
using the D-technology is proportional to the share of sales by firms using the foreign technology. This
gives:
Λ1−σD
Λ1−σA
=

1 + F
1− k
σ−1
M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1
+ L
∗
L F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1
1− F 1−
k
σ−1
M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1−1

−β˜
with β˜ = β . σ−1ε−1 . We obtain the expression in the text by combining these two expressions above. For-
eign presence (FPS), as defined in the main text, is factored out leaving an expression which can be seen
as a function of the cost advantage and the fraction of upgrading firms SM = F
1− k
σ−1
M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1−1
.
Comparative statics in welfare with partial technology adoption (type 2):
Using and inverting equation (10) describing the relative advantage of the foreign technology as a
function of the relative mass of downstream firms, we can simplify the welfare term associated with
input prices to get:
Λ1−σD
Λ1−σA
=
[
1 +
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
N˜M
N˜D
]−β˜
=
1 + λ1−εD
λ1−εM
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) 1
β˜
−β˜
Hence welfare gains can be rewritten:
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P 1−σ
P 1−σA
=
1 + F 1− kσ−1M
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
− 1
) k
σ−1
+
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) k
σ−1

σ−1
k
1 + λ1−εD
λ1−εM
(
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
) 1
β˜
−β˜ (22)
The partial derivative of the above expression w.r.t. the cost advantage of using the foreign technology
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
(holding other parameters constant) is zero. In particular, this partial derivative is positive when
the downstream curve (equation 15) is above the upstream curve (equation 10) and negative otherwise.
This means that the relative cost advantage of the foreign technology maximizes the above expression
when it corresponds to the equilibrium relative cost advantage. Applying the envelop theorem, we can
see that welfare gains (at equilibrium) decrease with the fixed cost of foreign entry FMNE and the fixed
cost of technology adoption FM .
Welfare with full technology adoption (type 3) compared to autarky:
Welfare in type 3: Since there is no firm using the D-technology in type-3 equilibrium, the price
index equation is based on the free-entry condition for domestic firms adopting the foreign technology:
P 1−σ
P 1−σA
=
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σA
.
Φ1−σM
Φ1−σA
.
1
1 + FM
In terms of threshold, we get:
ΦM
ΦA
= (1 + FM )
1
k
[
1 +
L∗
L
(
FMNE
1 + FM
)1− k
σ−1
] 1
k
Since the total number of suppliers remain the same, the relative price of inputs only depends on
relative costs of production:
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σA
=
(
λ1−σM
λ1−σD
)β
=
(
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
)β˜
We thus obtain:
P 1−σ
P 1−σA
=
(
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
)β˜
(1 + FM )
σ−1
k
−1
[
1 +
L∗
L
(
FMNE
1 + FM
)1− k
σ−1
]σ−1
k
(23)
Welfare: full technology adoption (type 3) vs. no or partial technology adoption:
In a type-2 equilibrium with partial technology adoption, the price index compared to autarky is
given by equation (22). Holding other variables constant, the left term in brackets is increasing in
the relative advantage of the foreign technology
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
. Hence, given that
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1 + FM in a type-2
equilibrium, and given that the second term into bracket (in equation 22) is smaller than one, we obtain:
P 1−σ
P 1−σA
<
[
1 + FM +
L∗
L
F
1− k
σ−1
MNE (1 + FM )
k
σ−1
]σ−1
k
= (1 + FM )
σ−1
k
[
1 +
L∗
L
(
FMNE
1 + FM
)1− k
σ−1
]σ−1
k
Then, using the assumption that the foreign technology is “superior”, i.e.
(
λ1−εM
λ1−εD
)β˜
(1 + FM )
−1 > 1,
and multiplying by this term, we obtain that the welfare gains in a type-2 equilibrium are smaller than
in a type-3 equilibrium as given by equation (23). The comparison to a type-1 equilibrium follows the
same logic. In this case, we can even impose a smaller upper bound for
Λ1−σM
Λ1−σD
< 1 < 1 + FM .
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